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Rationale of a macro-economic stabilisation mechanism
 The triple EMU dilemma
Internal Market
• Specialisation on the comparative advantage
• Abolishing barriers to market access
• Implementing harmonised EU standards
Monetary Union
• Supranationalised defintion and 
conduct of monetary policy
• No monetary policy instruments to 
compensate for economic performance
Budget Control
• Avoiding excessive deficits
• No monetary financing
• No automatic financial assistance 
• Full risk exposure to financial markets
How to establish national 
economies that are
specialised and resilient when 
facing asymmetric shocks?
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cyclical budgetary policies in 
times of crisis when fiscal 
shock-absorbers have to be 
financed by national budgets 
only and monetary policy 
instrument are not available?
Economic Policy 
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Rationale of a macro-economic stabilisation mechanism
 Incapacity of EMU to balance conflicting demands of EU law
– Specialising on the comparative advantage (internal market) but
having resilient national economies in a situation of an asymmetric 
shock (affecting one economic sector) (monetary union/budgetary 
control)
– Procyclical budgetary policies (budget control) but establishing 
shock-absorbers financed by national budgets to be activated in 
crisis times (monetary union)
– Refinancing of public budgets on private financial markets (budget 
control) but no monetary policy instruments (monetary union) and 
not capital controls (internal market) in order to react to market 
failure and to the closure of market access
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Rationale of a macro-economic stabilisation mechanism
 Cushioning of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks
– In a Currency Union, macroeconomic shocks cannot be compensated 
by nominal devaluation but only by real devaluation
• Prices and wages have to decrease (but are inflexible downwards)
• in order to avoid harmful short-term damages, there has to be a cushioning of 
exceptional expenses (e.g. short-term unemployment benefits)
– Smoothing out shocks is traditionally the role for fiscal policy and 
Unemployment Benefits Schemes
• At which level is the responsibility the best allocated? Member State/EA/EU?
 Promoting social/economic cohesion
Legal Framework for an 
EMU Macro-Economic 
Stabilisation Mechanism
Legal Questions
 Payment side I: Is there is legal base?
 Payment side II: Limitations for transfer of funding set by Article 
125(1) TFEU (the so-called ‘No Bailout’ clause)
 Financing side I: Does EU budget law allow for additional 
funding earmarked for the use by a Macro-Economic 
Stabilisation Mechanism?
 Financing side II: Does EU budget law allow for a differentiated 
integration?
Legal Framework for an EMU Macro-Economic 
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Payment side
Payment side: Is there a legal base?
 What is the aim that is predominantely pursued?
– Reinforcing multilateral surveillance?
• Article 121(6) TFEU
– Macroeconomic stabilisation in crisis times?
• Article 122(2) TFEU (used for the EFSM)
• Only when ‘exceptional occurences’
• Only ‘under certain conditions’, no automatization
– Reducing economic/social disparities?
• Article 175(3) TFEU (used for the EGF)
– Fallback option: Article 352(1) TFEU
Payment side: Limitations set by Article 125
 Issue of Article 125(1) TFEU (‘no bail-out’ clause)
– General principle that EU does not finance MS
• EU may only transfer funding to MS if there is an explicit legal base (such as e.g. 
in the case of cohesion policy)
• Otherwise, Article 125(1) TFEU sets the limits for any other transfer
– CJEU, Case C-370/12, Pringle
‘Article 125(1) TFEU does not prohibit the granting of financial assistance […] provided that the 
conditions attached to such assistance are such as to prompt that Member State to implement 
sound budgetary policies’
– Issue of conditionality
• Not required by the wording of Article 125(1) TFEU
• Pringle ‘only’ confirmed the legality of ESM, which is built on conditionality
• Core: Sound budgetary policies
Payment side: Limitations set by Article 125
– Understanding Article 125(1) TFEU
• EU/MS shall not be liable for or assume commitments of other MS
• MS are solely responsible for sound budgetary policies
– Sound budgetary policies of the participating countries as a precondition for financial 
stability in a currency area
– Sound budgetary policies mean that state budgets may not be used to finance the 
consequences of unsound economic policies
• Financial assistance is acceptable under Article 125(1) TFEU if it does not 
diminish a MS’s incentive to conduct sound budgetary policies
– Maastricht principle: Market pressure prompts Member States to conduct sound economic 
policies since the financial consequences of unsound economic policies will be costly to 
refinance on the private financial markets
– Applying to financial assistance: As long as it can be ensured that unsound budgetary 
policies can be avoided through mechanisms prompting sound economic policies, 
financial assistance is acceptable
– Not by definition: Conditionality
Financing side
Financing side
 Two ways of designing the financing side
– (1)  Within the EU budget
• Earmarking revenue for the exclusive use of the EMU Macro-Economic Stabilisation Mechanism
( External assigned revenue, Article 21(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 966/2012)
• External assigned revenue is excluded from MFF ceilings
• External assigned revenue is considered to be ‘other revenue’ in terms of Article 311 TFEU 
( no change of Own Resources Decision) (cf. Article 62(1)(a) of the EBA-Regulation)
• Legal base: Article 352(1) TFEU
– (2)  Dedicated fund outside EU budget
• Establishment of an agency with an own distinct budget
• Control by budgetary authorities (EP/Council) comparable to EU budget law in order not to 
circumvent institutional balance
• Legal base: Article 352(1) TFEU or IGA
Financing side
 Is a Euro area budget possible?
– Revenue
• Article 332 TFEU: Expenditure shall be borne by the participating MS
• Example: ‘High Flux Reactor’ (Council Decision 2012/709/Euratom)
– Expenditure
• Principle: The revenue shall be used without distinction to finance all expenditure entered in 
the general budget of the European Union
• Exception: Earmarking
– Certain revenue is assigned by the basic legal act on the creation of the revenue to 
a certain budget line 
– Example: Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1173/2013 on the enforcement of budgetary surveillance 
in the Euro area:
“The interest earned by the Commission […] shall constitute other revenue as referred to in Article 311 TFEU 
and shall be assigned to the EFSF.”
Financing side
 Possibility to raise debt
– Principle: EU is not allowed to raise debt in order to finance the general budget of 
the Union
– Precedents: e.g. EFSM may raise debt (Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) No 407/2010) 
– EU is allowed to enter into borrowing-and-lending operations for a specific and 
predefined purpose, which may not lead to an indirect financing of the general 
budget
– Legal base: Legal base of the legal act establishing the EMU Macro-Economic 
Stabilisation Mechanism
Proposals presented by the 
European Commission
Commission Proposals: COM(2017) 822 final
 European Investment Protection Scheme
– Support for public investment in the event of a severe economic 
downturn
 European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme
– Earmarked automatic direct payments to national unemployment 
benefit schemes
 Rainy Day Fund
– Automatic payments to national budgets after activation of a pre-
defined trigger
Commission Proposals: COM(2017) 822 final
 Financing of the stabilisation function
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